The Scientists Supporting Obama’s Iran Agreement are Puppets

The scientists supporting the Iran agreement have immense skill in their areas of expertise, but foreign policy is not one of those. When the New York Times trumpeted the support of 29 “scientists” for Obama’s nuclear Iran rajast62agreement, a number of facts were misrepresented. However, this misrepresentation of scientific expertise as political expertise, accomplished by omission, is especially illuminating; for it not only shows how scientists can be made puppets, but it highlights a number of 20th century fallacies that are turning the West to into similarly enslaved wooden dolls.

It doesn’t matter how many times we find scientists whose entire life work is dependent on government grants, we just can’t believe that scientists are puppets. That’s because we have been virtually brainwashed into connecting the word “scientist” to both objectivity and wisdom. One wonders if “honest scientist” is about to become as much a laughing stock as “honest journalist” or “honest politician.”  One recent expose by the New York Times highlighted a connection between a clear conflict of interest and extraordinarily dubious scientific research finding that consumption of Coke and other soft drinks does not lead to obesity. Sadly, the objectivity of the Times was just a veneer covering over its failure to expose the backgrounds of the scientists supporting Kerry’s deal with Tehran.

Leaving the notion of objectivity among scientists who have been part of governmental bodies in the past, or who have had labs funded by government in the past (as many of these signers did), consider their wisdom. In fact, the slightest bit of honest journalism by the Times would have easily dispensed with the notion that, scientists or not, the key signatores to this letter of support are wise in matters of foreign policy.

For instance, one of the key signers, Frank Von Hippel, has been a proponent of unilateral denuclearization for decades. His understanding of the workings of nuclear devices may be excellent, but his policy application of this scientific knowledge has been extremely unwise.

Again, a second big name scientific signatore, Sidney Drell, believes nuclear weapons do not deter Drellmilitary aggression in the modern world. Such a presupposition might lead Drell to think that a failure of a nuclear treaty with Iran is a lesser evil than the military or financial actions needed to neutralize Iranian nuclear capability. Again, Drell’s scientific knowledge concerning the details of the Iranian agreement may be immense, but his policy application of his knowledge is extraordinarily inadequate.

Yet another big name scientist signing the letter in support of President Obama’s treaty with Iran, Freeman Dyson, also once favored unilateral American nuclear disarmament (p. 245). These three are among the four top names and typify the 29 signatores. In other words, when it comes to the subject of American foreign policy, this list of highly skilled scientists is basically another collection of far left radical liberals. If they are not financial puppets of the big government left, they are certainly ideological puppets: unseeing, lightweight, painted faces dragged about by the dark, hidden powers of liberalism as they are made to to dance in a false light of policy expertise and objectivity.

A comparison of Senator Schumer’s press release to the letter signed by the 29 leftist scientists clearly demonschumer-flag-pin-jpgstrates where science meets policy. For instance, Schumer carefully explains the weaknesses of the twenty-four day “waiting” period, despite the administration’s “innovative” approach of searching for tell tale radioactive isotopes. Schumer is fully capable of rebutting the “scientific consensus” of the 29 because of his policy and political expertise. Indeed, any dime store philosopher could go even further than Schumer in asking why on earth a regime would even ask for a twenty-four day waiting period if it was negotiating in good faith.

The cabarets of Western life are really only puppet shows. We’ve become enslaved to darkness and inhuman in our reckoning perhaps, in part, because we have been far too haphazard in drawing the lines between science and philosophy. Just as it is so easy to imagine that a consensus of 29 scientists must be right about the Iran agreement, so also, far too frequently, in every area of modern expertise we blur the lines and, in so doing, we drink falsehood with facts and madness with science. There is absolutely no logical reason to connect a knowledge of science with an expertise in foreign policy, but these random appeals to authority are so frequent in our culture that making the assumption has become second nature. The hollow callousness of the West has come from the sorcery of those who, often not being experimental scientists themselves, tell us that science teaches blind, materialistic atheism. That’s just a lie.fathers

Tragically, in the fields of archaeology, paleontology, in historical analysis, in public policy, in legal analysis, in psychology, in ethics, in virtually every aspect of modern society, we have, without blinking, allowed a person’s scientific or specific expertise in a branch of study to cover for an atheistic philosophy. We’re being blinded. It is imperative that educational institutions understand and teach the demarcation among the kinds of science, the limits of each category of science, and, once again, reach into our own American history to return to the philosophical logic that once made our institutions and our culture great.

Global Warming was NEVER Scientific

A Philosophy of Science: Part I

All anyone has to do to get an American to believe any absurd lie is to hire some “scientist” with alphabet soup behind his name, put him in a white lab coat, and have him utter: “Science conclusively shows that…” Then name the absurdity: “the sky is green,” “toothpaste causes tooth decay,” or “fungi have an I.Q. equal to baboons.” The idiot American will wander off marveling and willing to vote for more limited economic conditions or to have fungi teach in the public schools.

Americans, and the West in general, can be excused to an extent for this naiveté about the claims of “science” because thelab1y are surrounded on every side with evidence of the power of science. From personal gardening, to cell phones, to manufacturing three dimensional plastic commodities of every possible shape, technology is advancing constantly in every category of life. Why shouldn’t Americans be utterly impressed with its claims? On the other hand, being so surrounded by science, it’s pathetically ironic that so many don’t understand the first thing about the nature of scientific claims. The blame for this, however, doesn’t rest solely with the modern moronic American. The fundamental issues of his confusion arise from a failure of public education that, in turn, can be traced back to the highest academic circles.

The primary culprit is failure in the field of scientific philosophy. The modern trend has been to count every field that wants to name itself scientific as scientific. This horror is a direct function of another aspect of idiotic American culture in which no one is allowed to say “no” to any other living creature. In a judicial retreat from such an obstinate enemy of reason, it seems reasonable not to be judgmental even concerning scientific judgments. Instead, it seems better to sort the fields of science into their kinds rather than to declassify branches of human study as non-science. Global warming can then be recognized as significantly different from the experimental or natural sciences in its methods, truth claims, and in the nature of the certainty it can provide.

Consider, as examples, the following categories of human study as elements that contrast with the natural sciences:

The study of man’s actions historic and current: This is the area of the greatest certainty. Words such as “true” and “false” can be applied in this area. This is the area of written history, law, and legal applications. This area does not include the science of archaeology except in so far as archaeology is involved with establishing the testimony of once living witnesses by application to written records. Causes are certain. People took actions or did not take actions that had certain specific results. Just because an event cannot be proven, someone, somewhere, past or present, dead or alive, knows or knew, what really happened. The words “cause” and “effect” have real meaning and statements are true to the events or they are less than true.

Antarctica Icebound Ship (1)

Dec. 2013: This Russian ship, researching vanishing polar ice, is, ironically, trapped in thick Antarctic ice.

The study of logical functions: This includes mathematics, linguistics, computer science, and logic itself. Here “true” and “false” do not apply. Although we often use these words colloquially, technically, we mean “valid” or “invalid.” To some extent a philosophical system can be judged as valid or invalid. Likewise, an utter lie can be valid or invalid. Great lies, like great literature, are internally valid.

Finally, in contrast to this brief context, consider the study of the natural sciences, those concerned with accurate descriptions of regularity. The more accurate the descriptions, the more immediately the regularities can be tested and the more powerful their predictive capabilities will be. The natural sciences, then, according to this definition, do not make truth claims. Validity is not as important in the natural sciences as it is in math. While certain aspects of a definition may not be perfectly logical, as long as the description allows scientists to measure regularity within a valid mathematical paradigm, the system of natural science developed is relevant and useful.

Cause and effect do not have “truth” values in the natural sciences because they are always open to revision. In the natural sciences a scientific theory may have an internal consistency or validity, but it cannot be said to be true, for it also is always, by its very nature, open to revision. Only insofar as a natural “law” or regularity is described accurately can it serve as a “cause” in a scientific theory.

The natural sciences describe what man has not done. They describe what all humanity experiences collectively. This is a shared experience exactly because it is what humanity finds, not what humanity has done. At times the natural sciences define a world that is amazingly orderly. Although this orderliness suggests truth values for ideas like “cause” and “effect” or “law” and “design,” such conclusions are not part of the study of the natural sciences at all. Instead, the truth value of these ideas are part of the study of philosophy of which every human partakes and of which more can be said elsewhere.

This open-ended, rough copy, descriptive and testable “causal feature” is unique to the natural sciences. It is, also, therefore, critically important in separating natural sciences from other branches of study. The causal features of true natural sciences must be immediately and directly testable. Therefore, the causal claim of a natural science is not “true” or “false” but “provable” or “not provable.” If it is not provable by an immediate test, the causal feature is simply irrelevant. Because an absurd causal theory must come from a human mind rather than from a regularity found in nature, descriptions of such theories as “false” are acceptable. Descriptions of false theories as “fraudulent” or “lunatic” are equally acceptable. However, natural science itself only discovers and then accurately describes regularities in the natural realm.

By accurate I mean Newton’s gravitational constant. While Newton’s causal claim seems almost self-evident to us today, itscientist took humanity thousands of years of studying the heavens before the accuracy of this scientific definition changed the world. In fact each of the four fundamental forces of physics exemplifies mathematically accurate causal definitions. Lavoisier, the father of the modern periodic table, murdered irrationally by the aggrieved, miserable ones of the French Revolution, named hydrogen and oxygen because they were testable causes. “Oxy-gen” means “acid maker” and “hydro-gen” means “water-maker” (See Lavoisier). The periodic table is a symphony of scientifically precise, immediately testable “causes.” The elements explain why certain compounds react and then change into others. By the way, the gravitational constant and atomic theory have been subject to change and revision throughout the last century. Science’s power is not in the immutability of its causal definitions.

Science’s power is in the application of its immediately testable first principles. The application of Newtonian physics allows us to hit the moon with a rocket. The application of the testable causes in chemistry has transformed the modern world.

Compare this now to the Theory of Global Warming. While the theories of natural science and chemistry have minutely accurate mathematical definitions as fundamental “causes,” where are such causes and constants anywhere in the Theory of Global Warming? They simply don’t exist. Where the natural sciences build citadels of mathematically valid superstructures, superstructures established by successful application to a wide range of phenomenon, there are absolutely no such mathematical ratios or equations anywhere in the Theory of Global Warming. Does the Theory of Global Warming utilize the scientific method? How could it? The effects of greenhouse gasses, the “cause” in this theory, can only be measured effectively in a closed space, yet Global Warming Theory must measure the interactions of heat and gasses on a massive, world-wide scale, enclosed only by gravity.

Is global warming unscientific? Despite the title of this article, this would be very difficult to argue in the muddled world of scientific philosophy; however, it is very much unlike the natural sciences, and that should be enough. The natural sciences, the sciences most Americans consider as the agents of “scientific progress,” depend on predicting repeatable, testable phenomenon. The arc of a cannonball doesn’t vary; that allows science to learn and predict.

So if global warming’s causes are not at all like those of natural science, then what about the knowledge claims it makes for its outcomes? No, these too are very unlike those of the natural sciences. Global warming theorists are interested in predicting a single outcome, an unprecedented outcome that depends on the agency of mankind and fossil fuels. Instead of describing a regularity, Global Warming is attempting to describe, as true, a single event. Global warming theory has no interest in reproducing regularities that occur in nature.  Hence, as to causal claims and as to the outcomes it claims to predict, Global Warming Theory is very much unlike the natural sciences.

While most Americans equate “scientific” with the natural sciences, there are other branches of widely accepted fields of science that, like global warming theory, are very different from the natural sciences in either the description of their causes or in the outcomes they seek to predict or demonstrate. Many of these fields acknowledge some of their differences with the natural sciences and have come to refer to their disciplines as “historical sciences.” This however is a misnomer for these fields seek to explain prehistory. Such fields must be filled with conjecture because one can never return to the world of prehistory in order to test the predictive capability of the scientific causes involved and there are no eye witnesses whose testimony can be evaluated. All such sciences, historic sciences,  are, like global warming, very different than the natural sciences. Everyone should say so loudly and often.

Darwinism is NOT a Natural Science

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This Living Fossil Speaks Against Darwinism: http://newsrescue.com/a-80-million-year-old-rare-frilled-shark-fossil-found-in-australia-speaks-against-darwinism/#ixzz3a4OuCgeb

Whether or not Megalodon lives or is indeed extinct, Darwinism is NOT a Natural Science. The whole point of evolutionary science is different than that of the natural or experimental sciences. Evolutionary science, like the theory of man-made climate change (see Part I), seeks to explain singular natural occurrence while the natural sciences seek to explain constantly recurring natural phenomenon. Without saying whether evolution is right or if it only an extinct relic of a dying culture, it is plain from thinking about science, that the point of experimental sciences and evolutionary sciences are different. This is a gentle way of saying that evolution not a science. If evolution or neo-Darwinism is fundamentally not like experimental sciences, it’s findings can’t be what we commonly call scientific.

Despite trying to claim Mendel’s law as its province, evolution really doesn’t try to explain constantly recurring processes. This is all the natural sciences, or experimental sciences care about, but evolution wants little to do with the recurring phenomenon studied in experimental sciences. Evolution may rely on naturally repeating processes as evidence for its conclusions, but that’s just the point. Evolution is always trying to take another step past the findings of the natural sciences. In so doing, its conclusions are always beyond the sphere of the experimental sciences. In other words, evolution’s conclusions, cannot be scientific.

Evolution’s primary purposes are to answer some of the same questions that philosophy must answer in order to accomplish philosophy’s object of explaining man’s identity and his relationship to the world. That’s why, since evolutionary science shares many of the same goals, claims, and challenges as philosophy, and since evolution is clearly separate from the natural sciences, evolutionary science should be considered a branch of philosophy. Evolution should be part of the departments of philosophy, and not of science.

Because the aims, goals, or purposes of evolutionary science are different from those of the natural sciences, the knowledge claims or conclusions of evolutionary science must also be different in quality.

While evolutionary scientists seek to explain what really did or what really did not happen, the natural sciences’ only value is in explaining what will happen based on what is happening. As in the discussion of any historic event, evolutionary biologists seek to establish a truth value for their conclusions or claims while a natural science’s value is only in the accuracy and precision of the description of changes in natural processes. While, yes, it is important that the chemist establish that two parts hydrogen and two parts oxygen really did combine to form water at a certain time or place according to a certain ratio; scientifically, what really happened that day is constantly on the laboratory table. The scientific reality behind what happened on a certain day when a certain scientist combined two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen and got water is what the natural scientist is all about. These two branches of science differ in this regard as much as the natural sciences differ from the study of human actions historic and present (see Part I). In the study of human actions historic and present, just like in the study of “evolutionary events,” what really did happen is all that matters. A human did or did not make a choice that did or did not have a direct effect.

In the nature of its goals, challenges, and conclusions, evolutionary science is somewhere between the natural sciences and the study of humans actions. Like the study of human actions, the truth value of what did or did not happen is of supreme importance to the evolutionary scientist. Like the study of human actions, the focus of the evolutionary scientist is on singular, unique, one-time occurrences in the past; specifically, the origins of each modern species. The events of these origins either really did or really did not happen. On the other hand, like a natural scientist, the evolutionary scientist seeks ongoing evolutionary processes as causes leading to the origin of the species. Like the natural scientist, evolutionary science may continually revise its hypotheses as ongoing genetic phenomena are more fully understood. To the extent that evolutionary scientists do not seek ongoing processes to explain the origins of the species, but rely only on the fossil record, they are in a position regarding certainty as difficult as geologists who study prehistory.

The Triops longicaudatus is a living fossil that hasn’t evolved in the last 220 million years.

However, unlike the study of human actions, the evolutionary scientist has no words of testimony to evaluate and, unlike the natural scientist, observing recurring phenomena is the smallest part of his science. While there are ongoing processes that he may seek and refine as causes or explanations, the fundamentals of the theory of evolution itself preclude the study of recurring phenomenon. For instance, each evolution, even within a species, according to evolutionary assumptions, occurs by chance. Hence, these cannot recur. Likewise, evolutionary scientists, by the precepts of their discipline itself, can make no predictions of future events by which they might test their axioms. Stranded between these two fields of human study, evolutionary science has not the comfort of the certainty found either in the study of human actions or in the natural sciences. What then is the fitting description for this discipline?

It ought to seem strangely vexing to evolutionary science to be thus uncertain while eternally wed to that branch of the natural sciences endowed with, in many respects, the highest degree of certainty; for the idea of evolutionary forces cannot be extricated from the study of living organisms, from biology. In many regards biology is the spoiled darling of the natural sciences, for she reveals absolutely indisputable causes and effects. Sight is the result of the eye, circulation of the heart, breath of the lungs, and hearing of the ear. The more biologists study, the more perfect the causal connections woven into living creatures prove themselves to be, for the human body is plainly a machine of almost unimaginable complexity and perfection. In physics scientists must speculate that the world is mechanical and that there are absolute physical laws by which everything can be explained. In chemistry too, the causes must be supplied by a philosophical faith in the orderliness of the universe; but in biology, in the study of living creatures, design screams from every cell via an intricacy that transcends human language.

From such wonders springs philosophy. While natural scientists surely pause in their work and marvel at what they’ve learned, and while such marvels must surely inspire them to further research, the goal of the natural sciences has nothing to do with the wonders they behold. Their field seeks certainty by accurately describing repeating phenomena and predicting their recurrence. Likewise, even if the inspiration to study evolution springs from the philosophersremarkable diversity of living things past and present, evolutionary science would claim that an accurate knowledge of the origins modern species is its only goal. While philosophy seeks the meaning of the cosmos, evolutionary theory, like the natural sciences, seeks the definition of this world. However, like philosophy, evolutionary science, seeks to identify what really did or did not happen in a past about which other people can tell us nothing. Philosophy wants these answers as part of understanding the nature of man and his relationship to the natural world. Hence, while the ultimate aims are different in philosophy and evolutionary science, both fields must, in part, cover the same ground. Hence, as is also the case with philosophy, evolutionary science must rely primarily on what evidence suggests. Philosophy and evolutionary science each have only circumstantial cases for their conclusions. The natural sciences, on the other hand, are forever producing the eye witness testimony of their causes or culprits for everyone to see. Even modern trials with video evidence lack the certainty of the natural sciences. Philosophy and evolutionary science would both be thrilled to produce a smoking gun, but the natural sciences reproduce the actual crime in minute, painstakingly slow motion detail for every jury they ever face.

The interest in tales of a Megalodon still living today is an example of how much people love imagining things that no human eye has ever seen. But this isn’t the field of the natural sciences, it is the field of philosophy and of philosophical science. It’s not that there isn’t a science to reconstructing how a Megalodon would appear. There mayshark-prehistotric-460x252 even be natural sciences involved in reconstructing such a creature realistically. However, ultimately, the natural sciences do not care, nor can they show with their usual certainty, whether or not we’ve gotten the recreation correct.

Again, both philosophers and evolutionary scientists must study things about which no other people can inform us, and they must form conclusions about events that do not recur. Although we tend to think of philosophers as old Greek guys in togas, those old Greek guys based much of their conjecture on the science, such as it was, of their times. Today, like evolutionary scientists, philosophers may generalize the universe based on modern scientific discoveries (see Clarke’s discussion of Liebniz).

Based then on the clear, clear differences between evolutionary science and the natural sciences, and recognizing philosophy as the branch of study most similar to evolutionary science in object, truth claims, and in their challenges to certainty, it seems reasonable to put evolutionary science into a group of sciences most properly call the “philosophic sciences.” While some, including Jay Gould himself, who recognize many of these differences in the fields of science enumerated above, call these fields “historical sciences,” this categorization is really a misnomer, for it is far too euphemistic.  Many elements of historical sciences can abide within the safety of the realm of having human eye witnesses who have left written testimony; however, so called historical sciences are really after subjects about which no human testimony exists. Calling evolutionary science and elements of paleontology, astronomy, and geology that fall into these categories merely “historical” sciences does the challenge and significance of their fields little justice. On the other hand, these key distinctions of which Gould and others whisper in their symposiums or delineate in their personal publications, should be broadcast with every new discovery and pounded into high school textbooks everywhere. The sciences that have changed the Western world are the natural sciences NOT the philosophic ones.

The Marxist Sciences: Evolution and Global Warming

A Philosophy of Science Part III

Despite significant evidence that the last decade has seen almost no rise (New York Times 6/11) in global temperatures, the United States president passionately endorsed the G-8 position that global warming is an issue more pressing as ever. Despite recent evidence that global cooling is taking place while green house gasses are emitted in volumes much greater than used in climate change computer models, former Vice President Al Gore has complained that the Obama administration’s new rules effectively raising the cost of carbon energy, are insufficient.

Graph

Climatologists all know what these numbers represent. The science behind global warming has been falling apart for a decade; however, instead of admitting the failure of their computer projections, they realign the models according to the new baselines (see IAEA projections).  Most recently, faced with the reality that no one believed the science, world leaders, despite a lack of evidence, persuaded the premier non-scientist in the world, the Roman Catholic Pope, to use his “Divine Authority” to command Roman Catholics accept economic ruin in the name of climate change science.

This problem doesn’t arise from epistemological or methodological problems in the historical sciences. Instead, the circumstantial nature of the evidence in the historical sciences allows for the psychological or philosophical power of the ideas embodied in some of these “historical sciences” to distort reality.

For instance, the study of global warming theory is, itself, not observable, and since its evidence is non-experimental, or of a nature that can be repeated in many different laboratories at will, it is tempting for some adherents to view the circumstantial evidence establishing the theory one way while those who don’t believe in the theory see the evidence differently. Recently, life-long environmentalist Tony Heller set the absolutely contradictory sets of evidence in opposition in the following chart:
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Are these conflicting evidentiary patterns the result of fraud or of bias? Either way,  the influence of powerful philosophic ideas will blur the interpretation of evidence and even the recognition of certain types of evidence. Laboratory results are far less susceptible to these kinds of human weakness than are the historical sciences, for the first requires only an eyewitness while the historical sciences must rely so heavily on circumstantial evidence, inference, and good judgment.

Hence, sciences that study past events and embody ideals that encompass philosophic questions about humanity’s identity and mankind’s relationship to the world  should be called  philosophical sciences.

Of course, political and economic factors play into the illogical stubbornness with which scientists refuse to be directed by the evidence, but these factors, in turn, are representative of the ideological power of the ideas embodied in global warming theory.

The ideas global warming science embodies work on human pride. People want to believe that they have the power to both predict and prevent climate events on a global scale. The idea that we don’t have this kind of power has an emotional impact. Additionally, the idea of man made climate change introduces the idea that mankind, without a powerfully restraining government, is dangerously evil and that only a powerfully restraining government can offer hope for humanity. Both of these ideologies are elements of a progressive philosophy. The former Vice President continues to make incendiary claims about global warming and only laments that he doesn’t have the scientific evidence to show what he knows is really important politically: that global warming will destroy us all with floods, tornadoes, and hurricanes. No one doubts the former Vice President’s  progressive, socialist ideology.

While scientists properly recognize the problems of scientific methodology and ultimate certainty (see Part II) when michaels-img1they distinguish between “historical sciences” and “experimental sciences,” the term “historical science” fails to recognize the psychological power of the ideas represented in these fields of study. Global warming should, based on its methods, aims, and knowledge claims, be associated with the historical sciences (see Part I), but it rarely is. On the other hand, evolutionary science is often placed in this category. Like global warming, evolutionary science embodies powerful philosophic ideas, the acceptance or rejection of which has a powerful impact on the psyche.

Evolution as a Philosophical Science

If Global Warming’s philosophic nature finds expression politically, she is but a young second cousin of the Marxist science that has dominated the political world for over 150 years. Marxism, a historic fiction based on humanity evolving into a workers’ paradise, piggybacks on the kraken of Darwinism and neo-Darwinism. Darwinian philosophy is in direct conflict with the Blessings of Liberty that is the foundation of the American Idea.

No matter with which view of the modern evolutionary debate one sides, it’s been plain that the posturing and defaming evident in the “scientific” exchanges on these topics have gone far beyond the usual squabbles of scientists passionate about their experimental theories. Even worse, because the evidence of purely historical sciences is only ever circumstantial at best, there would seem to be far less reason for the vicious recriminations that take place when an evolutionary theorist steps out of line and rejects Darwinism. What causes the intense emotional exchanges on these subjects? Philosophical ideas. Philosophy is strong drink. Discussions of the origin of humanity and mankind’s relationship to the natural world have tremendous philosophical implications in every category of life and government. This is not an excuse for “scientists” firing, lying about, and attempting to disgrace others who don’t agree with them (like Richard Sternberg of the Smithsonian Institute), but it is, instead, a kind of evidence that evolution, like global warming, is far different than many branches of scientific study.

Recent breakthroughs in genetics have pointed out complexities, even at the cellular level, that basically run out the cambrianexplosionclock on the claims of evolutionary science. Even by the geological clock of immense eons passing since the beginning, there is no mathematical way random coincidence can explain the complexity and diversity of the biological life that surrounds us (see my earlier article: “A Scientific Consensus: Darwinism is Dead”). But like global warming alarmists, instead of placidly dismissing Darwinism, evolutionary scientists protect the theory with a passion that transcends the grave. For instance, Jay Gould, noted paleontologist and evolutionary thinker, proposed an update to Darwin’s theory based on the fossil record. Gould’s theory still makes for lively debate (see “The Nature and Mechanisms of Evolution”) among evolutionary scientists, and is illustrative of the psychological power the philosophic ideas contained in evolutionary claims.

First, Gould’s example is illustrative because as is often the case in the study of the philosophical sciences, rather than simply proclaiming that Darwin’s theory does not measure up to the fossil record, Gould evolved Darwin’s theory into a slightly different one. In the philosophical science the the tendency to cling to a theory is greater than in other areas of study. Faced with irreconcilable new evidence, revise, but never surrender!  The power of the idea of a distant, unfeeling, Creator; or of only a vague “force” propelling creation, was an idea as important to Gould as the science itself.toast

Secondly, the spooky, ironic response of Gould’s evolutionary colleagues also shows the power of the philosophic ideas in these areas of study. In response to the mathematical problems of classical evolution in explaining the fossil record, Gould changed the neo-Darwinian explanation by focusing on group or species dynamics rather than on variations on individual life forms. Gould and Eldrege’s theory of “punctuated equilibrium” actually explains the fossil record better than neo-Darwinism, and it works well in explaining micro-evolutionary diversity among species all over the world. However, because Gould and Eldrege changed neo-Darwinism, their statistical explanation received such a beating from their evolutionary colleagues that Gould eventually retreated to more classical explanations of the fossil record. Why is this ironic? It’s ironic because Gould and Edredge’s colleagues could do the statistical math on the new theories of punctuated equilibrium that threatened the old hierarchy, but when it came to evaluating the statistical failures of neo-Darwinism, the very same math they’d just been so proficient at….crickets.

The congressional investigation Richard Sternberg’s workplace harassment revealed that the hubbub was because Steven Meyer’s article was the first pro-intelligent design article to be published in a refereed, peer reviewed publication. This raised concern, consternation, and furor among some scientists because having a peer reviewed article might be used to enhance the academic argument for intelligent design. They didn’t want to talk about it! Nothing could be allowed to challenge the shrine of the goddess.

In conclusion, it would be wise to separate the historical sciences into those that are philosophical and into those that do not involve ideas so toxic to human logic.