The Scientists Supporting Obama’s Iran Agreement are Puppets

The scientists supporting the Iran agreement have immense skill in their areas of expertise, but foreign policy is not one of those. When the New York Times trumpeted the support of 29 “scientists” for Obama’s nuclear Iran rajast62agreement, a number of facts were misrepresented. However, this misrepresentation of scientific expertise as political expertise, accomplished by omission, is especially illuminating; for it not only shows how scientists can be made puppets, but it highlights a number of 20th century fallacies that are turning the West to into similarly enslaved wooden dolls.

It doesn’t matter how many times we find scientists whose entire life work is dependent on government grants, we just can’t believe that scientists are puppets. That’s because we have been virtually brainwashed into connecting the word “scientist” to both objectivity and wisdom. One wonders if “honest scientist” is about to become as much a laughing stock as “honest journalist” or “honest politician.”  One recent expose by the New York Times highlighted a connection between a clear conflict of interest and extraordinarily dubious scientific research finding that consumption of Coke and other soft drinks does not lead to obesity. Sadly, the objectivity of the Times was just a veneer covering over its failure to expose the backgrounds of the scientists supporting Kerry’s deal with Tehran.

Leaving the notion of objectivity among scientists who have been part of governmental bodies in the past, or who have had labs funded by government in the past (as many of these signers did), consider their wisdom. In fact, the slightest bit of honest journalism by the Times would have easily dispensed with the notion that, scientists or not, the key signatores to this letter of support are wise in matters of foreign policy.

For instance, one of the key signers, Frank Von Hippel, has been a proponent of unilateral denuclearization for decades. His understanding of the workings of nuclear devices may be excellent, but his policy application of this scientific knowledge has been extremely unwise.

Again, a second big name scientific signatore, Sidney Drell, believes nuclear weapons do not deter Drellmilitary aggression in the modern world. Such a presupposition might lead Drell to think that a failure of a nuclear treaty with Iran is a lesser evil than the military or financial actions needed to neutralize Iranian nuclear capability. Again, Drell’s scientific knowledge concerning the details of the Iranian agreement may be immense, but his policy application of his knowledge is extraordinarily inadequate.

Yet another big name scientist signing the letter in support of President Obama’s treaty with Iran, Freeman Dyson, also once favored unilateral American nuclear disarmament (p. 245). These three are among the four top names and typify the 29 signatores. In other words, when it comes to the subject of American foreign policy, this list of highly skilled scientists is basically another collection of far left radical liberals. If they are not financial puppets of the big government left, they are certainly ideological puppets: unseeing, lightweight, painted faces dragged about by the dark, hidden powers of liberalism as they are made to to dance in a false light of policy expertise and objectivity.

A comparison of Senator Schumer’s press release to the letter signed by the 29 leftist scientists clearly demonschumer-flag-pin-jpgstrates where science meets policy. For instance, Schumer carefully explains the weaknesses of the twenty-four day “waiting” period, despite the administration’s “innovative” approach of searching for tell tale radioactive isotopes. Schumer is fully capable of rebutting the “scientific consensus” of the 29 because of his policy and political expertise. Indeed, any dime store philosopher could go even further than Schumer in asking why on earth a regime would even ask for a twenty-four day waiting period if it was negotiating in good faith.

The cabarets of Western life are really only puppet shows. We’ve become enslaved to darkness and inhuman in our reckoning perhaps, in part, because we have been far too haphazard in drawing the lines between science and philosophy. Just as it is so easy to imagine that a consensus of 29 scientists must be right about the Iran agreement, so also, far too frequently, in every area of modern expertise we blur the lines and, in so doing, we drink falsehood with facts and madness with science. There is absolutely no logical reason to connect a knowledge of science with an expertise in foreign policy, but these random appeals to authority are so frequent in our culture that making the assumption has become second nature. The hollow callousness of the West has come from the sorcery of those who, often not being experimental scientists themselves, tell us that science teaches blind, materialistic atheism. That’s just a lie.fathers

Tragically, in the fields of archaeology, paleontology, in historical analysis, in public policy, in legal analysis, in psychology, in ethics, in virtually every aspect of modern society, we have, without blinking, allowed a person’s scientific or specific expertise in a branch of study to cover for an atheistic philosophy. We’re being blinded. It is imperative that educational institutions understand and teach the demarcation among the kinds of science, the limits of each category of science, and, once again, reach into our own American history to return to the philosophical logic that once made our institutions and our culture great.

Global Warming was NEVER Scientific

A Philosophy of Science: Part I

All anyone has to do to get an American to believe any absurd lie is to hire some “scientist” with alphabet soup behind his name, put him in a white lab coat, and have him utter: “Science conclusively shows that…” Then name the absurdity: “the sky is green,” “toothpaste causes tooth decay,” or “fungi have an I.Q. equal to baboons.” The idiot American will wander off marveling and willing to vote for more limited economic conditions or to have fungi teach in the public schools.

Americans, and the West in general, can be excused to an extent for this naiveté about the claims of “science” because thelab1y are surrounded on every side with evidence of the power of science. From personal gardening, to cell phones, to manufacturing three dimensional plastic commodities of every possible shape, technology is advancing constantly in every category of life. Why shouldn’t Americans be utterly impressed with its claims? On the other hand, being so surrounded by science, it’s pathetically ironic that so many don’t understand the first thing about the nature of scientific claims. The blame for this, however, doesn’t rest solely with the modern moronic American. The fundamental issues of his confusion arise from a failure of public education that, in turn, can be traced back to the highest academic circles.

The primary culprit is failure in the field of scientific philosophy. The modern trend has been to count every field that wants to name itself scientific as scientific. This horror is a direct function of another aspect of idiotic American culture in which no one is allowed to say “no” to any other living creature. In a judicial retreat from such an obstinate enemy of reason, it seems reasonable not to be judgmental even concerning scientific judgments. Instead, it seems better to sort the fields of science into their kinds rather than to declassify branches of human study as non-science. Global warming can then be recognized as significantly different from the experimental or natural sciences in its methods, truth claims, and in the nature of the certainty it can provide.

Consider, as examples, the following categories of human study as elements that contrast with the natural sciences:

The study of man’s actions historic and current: This is the area of the greatest certainty. Words such as “true” and “false” can be applied in this area. This is the area of written history, law, and legal applications. This area does not include the science of archaeology except in so far as archaeology is involved with establishing the testimony of once living witnesses by application to written records. Causes are certain. People took actions or did not take actions that had certain specific results. Just because an event cannot be proven, someone, somewhere, past or present, dead or alive, knows or knew, what really happened. The words “cause” and “effect” have real meaning and statements are true to the events or they are less than true.

Antarctica Icebound Ship (1)

Dec. 2013: This Russian ship, researching vanishing polar ice, is, ironically, trapped in thick Antarctic ice.

The study of logical functions: This includes mathematics, linguistics, computer science, and logic itself. Here “true” and “false” do not apply. Although we often use these words colloquially, technically, we mean “valid” or “invalid.” To some extent a philosophical system can be judged as valid or invalid. Likewise, an utter lie can be valid or invalid. Great lies, like great literature, are internally valid.

Finally, in contrast to this brief context, consider the study of the natural sciences, those concerned with accurate descriptions of regularity. The more accurate the descriptions, the more immediately the regularities can be tested and the more powerful their predictive capabilities will be. The natural sciences, then, according to this definition, do not make truth claims. Validity is not as important in the natural sciences as it is in math. While certain aspects of a definition may not be perfectly logical, as long as the description allows scientists to measure regularity within a valid mathematical paradigm, the system of natural science developed is relevant and useful.

Cause and effect do not have “truth” values in the natural sciences because they are always open to revision. In the natural sciences a scientific theory may have an internal consistency or validity, but it cannot be said to be true, for it also is always, by its very nature, open to revision. Only insofar as a natural “law” or regularity is described accurately can it serve as a “cause” in a scientific theory.

The natural sciences describe what man has not done. They describe what all humanity experiences collectively. This is a shared experience exactly because it is what humanity finds, not what humanity has done. At times the natural sciences define a world that is amazingly orderly. Although this orderliness suggests truth values for ideas like “cause” and “effect” or “law” and “design,” such conclusions are not part of the study of the natural sciences at all. Instead, the truth value of these ideas are part of the study of philosophy of which every human partakes and of which more can be said elsewhere.

This open-ended, rough copy, descriptive and testable “causal feature” is unique to the natural sciences. It is, also, therefore, critically important in separating natural sciences from other branches of study. The causal features of true natural sciences must be immediately and directly testable. Therefore, the causal claim of a natural science is not “true” or “false” but “provable” or “not provable.” If it is not provable by an immediate test, the causal feature is simply irrelevant. Because an absurd causal theory must come from a human mind rather than from a regularity found in nature, descriptions of such theories as “false” are acceptable. Descriptions of false theories as “fraudulent” or “lunatic” are equally acceptable. However, natural science itself only discovers and then accurately describes regularities in the natural realm.

By accurate I mean Newton’s gravitational constant. While Newton’s causal claim seems almost self-evident to us today, itscientist took humanity thousands of years of studying the heavens before the accuracy of this scientific definition changed the world. In fact each of the four fundamental forces of physics exemplifies mathematically accurate causal definitions. Lavoisier, the father of the modern periodic table, murdered irrationally by the aggrieved, miserable ones of the French Revolution, named hydrogen and oxygen because they were testable causes. “Oxy-gen” means “acid maker” and “hydro-gen” means “water-maker” (See Lavoisier). The periodic table is a symphony of scientifically precise, immediately testable “causes.” The elements explain why certain compounds react and then change into others. By the way, the gravitational constant and atomic theory have been subject to change and revision throughout the last century. Science’s power is not in the immutability of its causal definitions.

Science’s power is in the application of its immediately testable first principles. The application of Newtonian physics allows us to hit the moon with a rocket. The application of the testable causes in chemistry has transformed the modern world.

Compare this now to the Theory of Global Warming. While the theories of natural science and chemistry have minutely accurate mathematical definitions as fundamental “causes,” where are such causes and constants anywhere in the Theory of Global Warming? They simply don’t exist. Where the natural sciences build citadels of mathematically valid superstructures, superstructures established by successful application to a wide range of phenomenon, there are absolutely no such mathematical ratios or equations anywhere in the Theory of Global Warming. Does the Theory of Global Warming utilize the scientific method? How could it? The effects of greenhouse gasses, the “cause” in this theory, can only be measured effectively in a closed space, yet Global Warming Theory must measure the interactions of heat and gasses on a massive, world-wide scale, enclosed only by gravity.

Is global warming unscientific? Despite the title of this article, this would be very difficult to argue in the muddled world of scientific philosophy; however, it is very much unlike the natural sciences, and that should be enough. The natural sciences, the sciences most Americans consider as the agents of “scientific progress,” depend on predicting repeatable, testable phenomenon. The arc of a cannonball doesn’t vary; that allows science to learn and predict.

So if global warming’s causes are not at all like those of natural science, then what about the knowledge claims it makes for its outcomes? No, these too are very unlike those of the natural sciences. Global warming theorists are interested in predicting a single outcome, an unprecedented outcome that depends on the agency of mankind and fossil fuels. Instead of describing a regularity, Global Warming is attempting to describe, as true, a single event. Global warming theory has no interest in reproducing regularities that occur in nature.  Hence, as to causal claims and as to the outcomes it claims to predict, Global Warming Theory is very much unlike the natural sciences.

While most Americans equate “scientific” with the natural sciences, there are other branches of widely accepted fields of science that, like global warming theory, are very different from the natural sciences in either the description of their causes or in the outcomes they seek to predict or demonstrate. Many of these fields acknowledge some of their differences with the natural sciences and have come to refer to their disciplines as “historical sciences.” This however is a misnomer for these fields seek to explain prehistory. Such fields must be filled with conjecture because one can never return to the world of prehistory in order to test the predictive capability of the scientific causes involved and there are no eye witnesses whose testimony can be evaluated. All such sciences, historic sciences,  are, like global warming, very different than the natural sciences. Everyone should say so loudly and often.

Darwinism is NOT a Natural Science

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This Living Fossil Speaks Against Darwinism: http://newsrescue.com/a-80-million-year-old-rare-frilled-shark-fossil-found-in-australia-speaks-against-darwinism/#ixzz3a4OuCgeb

Whether or not Megalodon lives or is indeed extinct, Darwinism is NOT a Natural Science. The whole point of evolutionary science is different than that of the natural or experimental sciences. Evolutionary science, like the theory of man-made climate change (see Part I), seeks to explain singular natural occurrence while the natural sciences seek to explain constantly recurring natural phenomenon. Without saying whether evolution is right or if it only an extinct relic of a dying culture, it is plain from thinking about science, that the point of experimental sciences and evolutionary sciences are different. This is a gentle way of saying that evolution not a science. If evolution or neo-Darwinism is fundamentally not like experimental sciences, it’s findings can’t be what we commonly call scientific.

Despite trying to claim Mendel’s law as its province, evolution really doesn’t try to explain constantly recurring processes. This is all the natural sciences, or experimental sciences care about, but evolution wants little to do with the recurring phenomenon studied in experimental sciences. Evolution may rely on naturally repeating processes as evidence for its conclusions, but that’s just the point. Evolution is always trying to take another step past the findings of the natural sciences. In so doing, its conclusions are always beyond the sphere of the experimental sciences. In other words, evolution’s conclusions, cannot be scientific.

Evolution’s primary purposes are to answer some of the same questions that philosophy must answer in order to accomplish philosophy’s object of explaining man’s identity and his relationship to the world. That’s why, since evolutionary science shares many of the same goals, claims, and challenges as philosophy, and since evolution is clearly separate from the natural sciences, evolutionary science should be considered a branch of philosophy. Evolution should be part of the departments of philosophy, and not of science.

Because the aims, goals, or purposes of evolutionary science are different from those of the natural sciences, the knowledge claims or conclusions of evolutionary science must also be different in quality.

While evolutionary scientists seek to explain what really did or what really did not happen, the natural sciences’ only value is in explaining what will happen based on what is happening. As in the discussion of any historic event, evolutionary biologists seek to establish a truth value for their conclusions or claims while a natural science’s value is only in the accuracy and precision of the description of changes in natural processes. While, yes, it is important that the chemist establish that two parts hydrogen and two parts oxygen really did combine to form water at a certain time or place according to a certain ratio; scientifically, what really happened that day is constantly on the laboratory table. The scientific reality behind what happened on a certain day when a certain scientist combined two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen and got water is what the natural scientist is all about. These two branches of science differ in this regard as much as the natural sciences differ from the study of human actions historic and present (see Part I). In the study of human actions historic and present, just like in the study of “evolutionary events,” what really did happen is all that matters. A human did or did not make a choice that did or did not have a direct effect.

In the nature of its goals, challenges, and conclusions, evolutionary science is somewhere between the natural sciences and the study of humans actions. Like the study of human actions, the truth value of what did or did not happen is of supreme importance to the evolutionary scientist. Like the study of human actions, the focus of the evolutionary scientist is on singular, unique, one-time occurrences in the past; specifically, the origins of each modern species. The events of these origins either really did or really did not happen. On the other hand, like a natural scientist, the evolutionary scientist seeks ongoing evolutionary processes as causes leading to the origin of the species. Like the natural scientist, evolutionary science may continually revise its hypotheses as ongoing genetic phenomena are more fully understood. To the extent that evolutionary scientists do not seek ongoing processes to explain the origins of the species, but rely only on the fossil record, they are in a position regarding certainty as difficult as geologists who study prehistory.

The Triops longicaudatus is a living fossil that hasn’t evolved in the last 220 million years.

However, unlike the study of human actions, the evolutionary scientist has no words of testimony to evaluate and, unlike the natural scientist, observing recurring phenomena is the smallest part of his science. While there are ongoing processes that he may seek and refine as causes or explanations, the fundamentals of the theory of evolution itself preclude the study of recurring phenomenon. For instance, each evolution, even within a species, according to evolutionary assumptions, occurs by chance. Hence, these cannot recur. Likewise, evolutionary scientists, by the precepts of their discipline itself, can make no predictions of future events by which they might test their axioms. Stranded between these two fields of human study, evolutionary science has not the comfort of the certainty found either in the study of human actions or in the natural sciences. What then is the fitting description for this discipline?

It ought to seem strangely vexing to evolutionary science to be thus uncertain while eternally wed to that branch of the natural sciences endowed with, in many respects, the highest degree of certainty; for the idea of evolutionary forces cannot be extricated from the study of living organisms, from biology. In many regards biology is the spoiled darling of the natural sciences, for she reveals absolutely indisputable causes and effects. Sight is the result of the eye, circulation of the heart, breath of the lungs, and hearing of the ear. The more biologists study, the more perfect the causal connections woven into living creatures prove themselves to be, for the human body is plainly a machine of almost unimaginable complexity and perfection. In physics scientists must speculate that the world is mechanical and that there are absolute physical laws by which everything can be explained. In chemistry too, the causes must be supplied by a philosophical faith in the orderliness of the universe; but in biology, in the study of living creatures, design screams from every cell via an intricacy that transcends human language.

From such wonders springs philosophy. While natural scientists surely pause in their work and marvel at what they’ve learned, and while such marvels must surely inspire them to further research, the goal of the natural sciences has nothing to do with the wonders they behold. Their field seeks certainty by accurately describing repeating phenomena and predicting their recurrence. Likewise, even if the inspiration to study evolution springs from the philosophersremarkable diversity of living things past and present, evolutionary science would claim that an accurate knowledge of the origins modern species is its only goal. While philosophy seeks the meaning of the cosmos, evolutionary theory, like the natural sciences, seeks the definition of this world. However, like philosophy, evolutionary science, seeks to identify what really did or did not happen in a past about which other people can tell us nothing. Philosophy wants these answers as part of understanding the nature of man and his relationship to the natural world. Hence, while the ultimate aims are different in philosophy and evolutionary science, both fields must, in part, cover the same ground. Hence, as is also the case with philosophy, evolutionary science must rely primarily on what evidence suggests. Philosophy and evolutionary science each have only circumstantial cases for their conclusions. The natural sciences, on the other hand, are forever producing the eye witness testimony of their causes or culprits for everyone to see. Even modern trials with video evidence lack the certainty of the natural sciences. Philosophy and evolutionary science would both be thrilled to produce a smoking gun, but the natural sciences reproduce the actual crime in minute, painstakingly slow motion detail for every jury they ever face.

The interest in tales of a Megalodon still living today is an example of how much people love imagining things that no human eye has ever seen. But this isn’t the field of the natural sciences, it is the field of philosophy and of philosophical science. It’s not that there isn’t a science to reconstructing how a Megalodon would appear. There mayshark-prehistotric-460x252 even be natural sciences involved in reconstructing such a creature realistically. However, ultimately, the natural sciences do not care, nor can they show with their usual certainty, whether or not we’ve gotten the recreation correct.

Again, both philosophers and evolutionary scientists must study things about which no other people can inform us, and they must form conclusions about events that do not recur. Although we tend to think of philosophers as old Greek guys in togas, those old Greek guys based much of their conjecture on the science, such as it was, of their times. Today, like evolutionary scientists, philosophers may generalize the universe based on modern scientific discoveries (see Clarke’s discussion of Liebniz).

Based then on the clear, clear differences between evolutionary science and the natural sciences, and recognizing philosophy as the branch of study most similar to evolutionary science in object, truth claims, and in their challenges to certainty, it seems reasonable to put evolutionary science into a group of sciences most properly call the “philosophic sciences.” While some, including Jay Gould himself, who recognize many of these differences in the fields of science enumerated above, call these fields “historical sciences,” this categorization is really a misnomer, for it is far too euphemistic.  Many elements of historical sciences can abide within the safety of the realm of having human eye witnesses who have left written testimony; however, so called historical sciences are really after subjects about which no human testimony exists. Calling evolutionary science and elements of paleontology, astronomy, and geology that fall into these categories merely “historical” sciences does the challenge and significance of their fields little justice. On the other hand, these key distinctions of which Gould and others whisper in their symposiums or delineate in their personal publications, should be broadcast with every new discovery and pounded into high school textbooks everywhere. The sciences that have changed the Western world are the natural sciences NOT the philosophic ones.